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Abstract. Human cognitive modeling techniques and related software
tools have been widely used by researchers and practitioners to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of user interface (UI) designs and related human
performance. However, they are rarely used in the cyber security field
despite the fact that human factors have been recognized as a key ele-
ment for cyber security systems. For a cyber security system involving a
relatively complicated UI, it could be difficult to build a cognitive model
that accurately captures the different cognitive tasks involved in all user
interactions. Using a moderately complicated user authentication system
as an example system and CogTool as a typical cognitive modeling tool,
this paper aims to provide insights into the use of eye-tracking data for
facilitating human cognitive modeling of cognitive tasks more effectively
and accurately. We used visual scan paths extracted from an eye-tracking
user study to facilitate the design of cognitive modeling tasks. This al-
lowed us to reproduce some insecure human behavioral patterns observed
in some previous lab-based user studies on the same system, and more
importantly, we also found some unexpected new results about human
behavior. The comparison between human cognitive models with and
without eye-tracking data suggests that eye-tracking data can provide
useful information to facilitate the process of human cognitive modeling
as well as to achieve a better understanding of security-related human
behaviors. In addition, our results demonstrated that cyber security re-
search can benefit from a combination of eye-tracking and cognitive mod-
eling to study human behavior related security problems.
Keywords: Eye-tracking, cognitive modeling, CogTool, user interface,
design, cyber security, human behavior, user authentication
1 Introduction
Psychologists and computer scientists have developed computational cognitive
architectures and models (e.g. ACT-R [1,4], Soar [21,29] and CLARION [30]) to
simulate human behaviors using computers to study human cognitive processes
such as perception, memory, and attention. Due to their ability to help design-
ers and researchers evaluate human performance and refine user interface (UI)
designs more easily without prototyping and user testing [13], cognitive models
such as Keystroke-Level Model (KLM) [8] and other more complicated models
following the GOMS (Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection) rules [17] have
been widely used in the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) field. However, such
models are relatively less known to and used by cyber security researchers and
practitioners, except for some limited work on using human cognitive modeling
tools to estimate usability of user authentication systems [19,20,28].
Although human cognitive modeling is less used in the cyber security field,
the wider human factors have been actively studied by cyber security researchers.
It is well known that many security problems are caused by insecure human
behaviors such as weak passwords and poorly-designed/-implemented security
policies. In addition, the UI design of a system may lead to insecure human be-
haviors and thereby compromise the system’s security. For instance, as reported
in [24,33], for many challenge-response based password systems against observer
attacks, human users respond to different challenges differently in terms of the
time spent. This allows an attacker to derive the password based on some observ-
able timing differences after seeing a sufficient number of authentication sessions
conducted by a target user.
The “standard” approach to identifying insecure human behaviors is to con-
duct user studies with real human participants. However, this approach is not
only time consuming, but also has other issues such as limited/bias samples,
ethical concerns, and privacy issues, which could potentially delay the detection
of human behavior related security problems and leave systems vulnerable to
potential attacks for a longer time. Therefore, it is important and beneficial for
both security system designers and end users to discover human behavior re-
lated security problems as early as possible ideally at the design stage, which
can be considered as a special case of the widely-recognized “security by design”
principle [11].
Differently from the above standard approach, cognitive modeling could pro-
vide a quicker and sometimes also better solution to study human behavior re-
lated security problems. Considering the broad scope of cyber security systems
as well as potential security problems related to human behavior, this paper
does not aim to provide a comprehensive account of how to model human cog-
nitive tasks for any cyber security systems, instead, we use one advanced user
authentication system as a representative example to show how human cogni-
tive modeling can help UI designers and security analysts. Furthermore, some
researchers have reported that eye-trackers can provide useful information for
cognitive modeling tasks, but the combined use of eye-tracking and cognitive
modeling technologies for security-sensitive systems is very rare. We hope this
paper will fill this gap as well.
In this paper, we report our work on combining eye-tracking data and Cog-
Tool [16], a widely-used cognitive modeling tool, to model human cognitive
tasks involved in a relatively complex user authentication system called Un-
dercover [27]. The eye-tracking data proved useful for guiding the modeling
process, and helped us to reproduce some non-uniform and insecure human
behavior observed in a previous lab-based user study conducted by Perkovic´
et al. in 2011 [24]. The simulation results of the eye-tracking assisted cognitive
model led to more insights into the observed non-uniform human behavior and
how the UI design may be further refined to improve its security, going beyond
what Perkovic´ et al. predicted in [24]. Our work suggests that cyber security
researchers and practitioners could benefit from a combined use of cognitive
modeling techniques and eye-tracking data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some
related work. Then, we describe the authentication system (Undercover) we fo-
cused on as a showcase, how we used eye-tracking data to refine the cognitive
model of Undercover, and what new insights we learned from the process. The fi-
nal section discusses the benefits of using eye-tracking data in cognitive modeling
of cyber security systems.
2 Related Work
Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection rules (GOMS) are among the well-
established cognitive modeling concepts for analyzing UIs. A number of variants
of GOMS models such as KLM, CMN-GOMS [9], and CPM-GOMS [17] have
been proposed. Most of these cognitive models can estimate human performance
in terms of time needed by an average skilled user to complete a specific task.
Differently from GOMS models, low-level cognitive architectures and models
such as ACT-R [1, 4] and Soar [21, 29] can be used to model broader human
cognitive processes, e.g., modeling users’ performance on multi-modal UIs such
as car navigation systems, which represents a challenge for traditional GOMS
analysis [6, 26]. ACT-R specifies the time parameters of processes such as the
shifting of a user’s visual attention, so it can be used to model visual search
tasks. For example, Fleetwood and Byrne [12] compared two models representing
different strategies of searching for a target icon among distractors.
Cognitive models and related software tools do not normally have built-in
support on various UI elements. To fill the gap, a number of software tools (e.g.
CogTool [16], SANLab-CM [23], Cogulator [31]) have been developed to make
cognitive modeling tasks easier. Such tools often implement a GOMS model
from a user-defined UI layout design and then convert that to a model based
on one of the lower-level cognitive architectures such as ACT-R. Although these
tools are very powerful to support cognitive modeling tasks, it could be difficult
for a designer to decide how to model a system involving complicated cognitive
tasks, e.g., if they depend on individual characteristics and/or the context. One
of the widely-used human cognitive modeling tools in the HCI community is
CogTool [16], which is based on KLM and ACT-R and has proven to be a
useful tool for predicting and simulating human performance of skilled users to
complete computer tasks [18].
Despite the fact that human cognitive modeling has been extensively studied
and used in the HCI field, to the best of our knowledge only a few studies in the
cyber security community used cognitive modeling to evaluate/design security
systems. Kim et al. [19] used CogTool to evaluate the usability of a shoulder surf-
ing resistant mobile user authentication system, and Sasse et al. [28] combined
CogTool with a user study to estimate the usability of a user authentication sys-
tem. Kwon et al. [20] used CPM-GOMS to investigate human shoulder surfers
attacking PIN entry methods that rely on the evidence of effective human per-
ceptual and cognitive capabilities.
Although cognitive modeling has not been extensively used in the cyber se-
curity field, some cyber security researchers have started considering human
cognitive abilities in the design of cyber security systems to achieve a better
balance between usability and security. Belk et al. [5] proposed two-step person-
alized user authentication tasks based on individual cognitive styles of processing
textual and graphical information. Al Galib et al. [2] designed a new user authen-
tication system based on a game of cognitive tasks to capture individual users’
implicit cognitive signatures. More recently, Castelluccia et al. [10] developed a
new authentication scheme (MooneyAuth) based on using implicit memory to
reduce the cognitive load of remembering passwords. Such work also calls for
more research on modeling of human cognitive abilities to study usability and
the security of such systems.
Eye trackers capture human users’ eye movements (fixations and saccades),
scan paths, and metrics such as pupil dilation and blinks which provide in-
formation about the user’s cognitive processes while performing a task. Thus,
they have been widely used in studies on cognitive modeling especially on cog-
nitive tasks related to visual objects shown on computer displays [14]. Some
researchers also used eye trackers to help validate and compare cognitive mod-
els of visual search tasks [7, 12, 15, 25]. There is also research about using eye
trackers to better understand human users’ cognitive processes when interacting
with security-sensitive systems, e.g., recently Miyamoto et al. [22] conducted a
study on using eye-tracking data to link UI elements to the detection of possible
phishing websites. Alsharnouby et al. [3] used eye trackers to assess the influence
of browser security indicators and the awareness of phishing on a user’s ability
to avoid cyber attacks. While there is quite some work on the combined use of
eye tracking and cognitive modeling, to the best of our knowledge, except some
general recommendations such as those reported in [15] still limited work has
been done on combining the two techniques for cyber security applications. This
paper aims to further advance this neglected area.
3 Eye-Tracking Assisted Cognitive Modeling Experiment
In this section, we explain our work in detail. We start with a brief description
of the target system Undercover. Then we report our initial cognitive models
of Undercover and the simulation results when eye-tracking data were not used.
These are followed by an explanation of the eye-tracking experiment we con-
ducted to improve the initial models which were found inaccurate. The last part
of the section presents our re-modeling work and the new insights emerged from
the eye-tracking assisted cognitive modeling experiment.
3.1 Target System: Undercover
(a)
(b)
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Fig. 1. The UI of Undercover [27]: (a) the public challenge panel shown on the computer
display; (b) a box composed of the following UI components: (b1) a track ball for
transmitting the hidden challenge, (b2) the hidden challenge button layout panel, (b3)
the response button panel.
Undercover [27] is an observer-resistant password system (ORPS) developed
based on the concept of partially-observable challenges. The password P a user
needs to set is a set of five secret pictures called “pass-pictures”, selected out of
an image pool. To complete an authentication session, the user needs to correctly
respond to seven challenge screens, where each challenge screen contains a hidden
challenge ch described below and a public challenge cp consists of four pictures
and a “no pass-picture” icon as shown in Fig. 1(a). The hidden challenge ch
is transmitted via a haptic device (a track ball) covered by the user’s palm,
as shown in Fig. 1(b1). Five different rotation/vibration modes of the track
ball correspond to five different values of ch: “Up”, “Down”, “Left”, “Right”,
“Center” (vibrating). As illustrated in Fig. 1(b2), each hidden challenge value
corresponds to a specific layout of five response buttons labeled with 1-5. To
respond to a challenge screen, the user should firstly obtain a hidden response
rh which is the position index of the pass-picture in the public challenge (1-4
if present and 5 if absent). Then the user looks for rh in the correct hidden
challenge button layout to get a new position index r′h, and finally presses the
button labeled with r′h in the response button panel as shown in Fig. 1(b3). There
are some more subtle security settings, for which readers are referred to [24,27].
There are three main reasons why we chose Undercover for our work:
1. Undercover is a relatively complex security-sensitive system that involves
different cognitive tasks that are not straightforward to model.
2. Perkovic´ et al. [24] conducted a lab-based user study that revealed some non-
uniform and insecure behavioral patterns on how human users responded to
hidden challenges (the average response time to the hidden challenge value
“Up” is significantly smaller than to other values) which were believed to be
caused by an improper design of the UI.
3. How human users actually interact with the Undercover UI remains largely
unclear which may lead to other security problems or insights of a better UI
design.
We therefore wanted to use eye-tracking data and CogTool to see if we can re-
produce the non-uniform behavioral patterns observed and provide some further
insights about the actual human behaviors, which will then serve as a good exam-
ple showcasing the usefulness of combining eye tracking with cognitive modeling
techniques.
3.2 Initial CogTool Models (without Eye-tracking Data)
To make an adequate comparison with findings reported by Perkovic´ et al. [24],
we used CogTool to model their Undercover implementation (which is conceptu-
ally the same as the original Undercover system reported in [27] but with some
minor changes to the UI and the use of an earphone and an audio channel to
transmit the hidden challenge instead). The layout of the UI with functionality of
each component (which is called the design script in CogTool), and how human
interact with the UI (which is called the demonstration script in CogTool) are
essential to CogTool. Undercover has a static UI layout, but the user interaction
is dynamic where different hidden challenges can result in different visual scan
paths, and require different buttons to be pressed.
A key problem we met in the modeling task is how to model human users’
visual scan paths for the three separate parts of a challenge screen: the public
challenge picture panel, the hidden challenge button layout panel, and the re-
sponse button panel. Since we did not have any clue about the actual visual scan
paths, we decided to make two initial models based on two simple visual scan
paths explained below and shown in Fig. 2.3
– A1: for each part of the challenge screen the user identifies the target without
an obvious visual searching process, i.e., the user looks at the pass-picture
in the public challenge panel, then moves to the (correct) hidden challenge
button layout directly, and finally to the (correct) response button directly.
– A2: the same as A1 but before the user looks at the (correct) hidden chal-
lenge button layout (s)he looks at the whole hidden challenge button layout
panel first.
 public challenge 
picture panel
 hidden challenge 
button layout panel
response 
button panel
Fig. 2. An illustration of the two visual scan paths when the pass-picture is the second
picture in the public challenge and the hidden challenge is “Left”: the red dashed and
dark green dotted lines show A1 and A2, respectively.
With the two models, we generated all five possible instances according to the
hidden response rh = 1, · · · , 5 and obtained the average response times as shown
in Fig. 3. Comparing the results of A1 and A2, we can see A2 requires more time
due to the added cognitive task, and the hidden challenge value corresponding
to the fast average response time differs (“Up” for A1 and “Center” for A2).
While the non-uniform response time pattern of A1 loosely matches the findings
3 We actually built a number of models for each of the two models as CogTool supports
only static cognitive tasks but Undercover involves dynamic ones related to varying
challenges. We are developing an extension of CogTool to facilitate modeling of such
dynamic cognitive tasks, but in this paper we will not focus on this issue.
reported in [24], the cognitive model is obviously too simplistic, e.g., a proper
visual searching process is expected for finding out if a pass-picture is present
and where the pass-picture is in the public challenge.
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Fig. 3. Average response times for (a) A1 and (b) A2.
3.3 Eye-tracking Experiment
As shown above, the lack of knowledge on human users’ actual visual scan paths
prevented us from making a more informed decision on how to model Undercover.
We therefore decided to conduct an eye-tracking experiment in order to gain such
knowledge. We implemented a fast prototype of Undercover in MATLAB and
used a Tobii EyeX eye tracker (with an upgraded license for research purposes)
[32] for the experiment. Nine participants (5 female and 4 male), who did not
wear glasses were recruited. Each participant was briefed about Undercover and
had a training session to get familiar with the authentication process. We set
the same password for all participants, and each participant was given time to
memorize the pass-pictures before the actual experiment started.
During the experiment, each participant was asked to complete seven chal-
lenge screens (equivalent to one authentication session) once or twice. Among
the seven challenge screens, each of the five values of the hidden challenge and
the hidden response was present at least once. In total, we collected 98 sets of
eye-tracking data (each set represents the process of responding to one challenge
screen). We removed 12 sets of data due to inaccuracy caused by change of sitting
position during the experiment and incomplete tasks. This gave us 86 valid sets
of data whose eye-gaze trajectories were manually inspected to identify visual
scan patterns. The results revealed four important (not all expected) visual scan
patterns explained below and illustrated in Fig. 4.
1. No obvious searching process for the correct hidden challenge button layout
or the correct response button: For these two parts of the challenge screen,
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. An illustration of observed visual scan patterns where red lines show the eye
gaze trajectories, blue circles and blue crosses indicate the starting and ending gazing
positions: (a) rh = 1, ch = Left; (b) rh = 5, ch = Right.
participants identified the targets directly without an obvious visual search-
ing process.
2. Two searching patterns for the pass-picture: For 87% cases, participants
adopted a searching strategy of center-left-right as illustrated in Fig. 4(a),
and for the rest 13% cases, participants searched for the pass-picture simply
from left to right.
3. Confirmation pattern for the pass-picture: For 59% of all cases, participants
showed a confirmation pattern where they went from the hidden challenge
button layout panel back to the pass-picture in the public challenge panel
before moving to the response button panel, which are highlighted inside the
green dash-line rectangles shown in Fig. 4. This pattern is consistent with the
findings reported in [25], which suggests that several saccades to the location
of the memorized target are typical. We also noticed that the confirmation
process rate varies depending on the value of the hidden challenge (see Fig. 5)
ch: 40.91% (Up), 92.31% (Down), 64.71% (Left), 61.9% (Right), 46.15%
(Center). Interestingly, the non-uniform confirmation rates partly match the
non-uniform response time reported in [24], suggesting they may be one
source of the non-uniformity.
4. Double scanning pattern for absent pass-picture: When no pass-picture is
present in the public challenge, in 66% cases participants double scanned
the public challenge picture panel to make sure there was indeed no pass-
picture, which is illustrated in Fig. 4(b).
3.4 Re-modeling Undercover (with Eye-tracking Data)
The four visual scan path patterns learned from our eye-tracking experiment
provided additional evidence for us to remodel Undercover in a more compli-
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Fig. 5. Confirmation rate for hidden challenges
cated (and hopefully more accurate) manner. We firstly constructed four new
models named as CLR-C, CLR-NC, LR-C and LR-NC, where CLR represents
the (C)enter-(L)eft-(R)ight searching strategy for the pass-picture; LR repre-
sents the simpler (L)eft-(R)ight searching strategy for the pass-picture; C after
the hyphen stands for the (C)onfirmation process and NC after the hyphen
means there is (N)o (C)onfirmation process. As in the case of the two initial
models, for each of the above models we also created five instances for the five
values of rh for each model to get the average response time. When rh = 5 (i.e.,
there is no pass-picture in the public challenge), we also created two further sub-
models with and without the double scanning pattern, whose simulation results
(response times) are then added up using the weights 0.66 and 0.34 to get the
predicted average response time for the case of rh = 5.
The results of the predicted average response time for all the four models
are shown in Table 1, from which we can see the hidden challenge value corre-
sponding to the smallest average response time is “Up” (consistently across all
models), matching the findings reported in [24].
Based on the four models, we constructed a mixed probabilistic model where
CLR-LR and N-NC patterns are considered based on different probabilities: 87%
CLR and 13% LR for all challenge values; 40.9% C and 59.1% NC for “Up”,
92.3% C and 7.7% NC for “Down”, 64.7% C and 35.3% NC for “Left”, 61.9% C
and 38.1% NC for “Right”, 46.2% C and 53.8% NC for “Center”. The predicted
average response time for each hidden challenge value of the mixed probabilistic
model is shown in Fig. 6(a), where the average response time for the hidden
Model
Hidden Challenge
Up Down Left Right Center
CLR-C 4148.2 4331.6 4266.2 4229.2 4243.8
CLR-NC 3385.0 3453.2 3445.4 3401.2 3424.6
LR-C 4125.3 4297.5 4232.8 4203.5 4220.3
LR-NC 3362.1 3419.1 3411.9 3375.5 3401.1
Table 1. Average response time (in milliseconds) to each hidden challenge value for
different models.
challenge value “Up” is significantly smaller than for other four values, which
accords with the finding in [24].
We also looked at the average response times for different values of rh and the
results are shown in Fig. 6(b). The results confirmed another observation in [24],
which states that most users tended to respond more slowly when rh = 5 (i.e.,
there is no pass-picture in the public challenge), and this could be explained by
the double scanning pattern we described above. Furthermore, as identified in
our eye-tracking experiment, in most cases participants adopted the CLR visual
searching strategy for the pass-picture, and thus it is not surprising to observe
that rh = 3 (when the pass-picture is right in the middle of the public challenge
panel) corresponds to the smallest average response time.
Comparing with the results reported in [24], there are still some noticeable
differences. These differences could be caused by some subtle differences be-
tween our experimental setup and the one used in [24]. For instance, in the user
study reported in [24], participants were allowed to use either mouse or key-
board to click the response button. However, for our models only mouse users
are considered because keyboard users are more difficult to model due to various
keyboard types and different individual human behaviors of using the keyboard.
The smaller and different population of participants used in our experiment may
be another source.
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Fig. 6. Average response times (in milliseconds) for different values of (a) the hidden
challenge ch and (b) the hidden response rh.
Our model could be further refined by considering the additional mental ef-
fort of converting rh to r
′
h. This will differ for different values of ch because
this conversion is effectively not needed for “Up” (the hidden challenge response
button layout is “12345”, which means r′h = rh). We thus can reasonably hy-
pothesize that there will be less mental efforts for the “Up” case so that the
response time is faster, which is also the main hypothesis Perkovic´ made in [24].
However, as demonstrated in the above results, the conversion process from rh
to r′h is not the sole (may not be even the main) factor causing the observed
non-uniform human behavior on average response time, which is a new insight
obtained from our eye-tracking experiment. In our future work, we plan to inves-
tigate the conversion process from rh to r
′
h and see how that can be considered
in the cognitive modeling task.
4 Conclusion
Taking Undercover [27] as a relatively complex user authentication system and
CogTool as a typical cognitive modeling tool, we demonstrated that the use of
an eye tracker can help identify different visual scan patterns which can effec-
tively guide computational modeling of human cognitive tasks. The eye-tracking
assisted cognitive modeling approach allowed us to not only reproduce some
previously-observed behavioral patterns of human users reported in [24], but
also to reveal more unexpected observations of related human behaviors. While
our work mainly focuses on a specific system, the insights we learned from the
eye-tracking assisted cognitive modeling suggest eye-tracking should be used
more widely in cognitive modeling of any cyber security systems with some
visual elements in their UIs. We are developing a software tool as an exten-
sion version of CogTool, which will cover (semi-)automated fast prototyping and
(semi-)automated application of eye-tracking data to adapt cognitive models.
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